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iscussions about fiscal deficits—government
outlays less tax receipts as a percentage of gross
domestic product (GDP)—often overlook the
importance of global factors in common movements across
countries. The left panel of the figure, for example, shows
that deficits in Canada, France, Germany, the United
Kingdom, and the United States declined from the mid- to
the late-1980s, increased with the global recession of 1990,
and then improved again from about 1992 through 2000.
Recently, however, deficits have increased; in Germany
and France, they are larger than the European Monetary
Union limit of 3 percent of GDP. 
Why do national fiscal deficits tend to move together?
One reason is that deficits react to common business cycle
shocks. That is, global economic activity is subject to
common shocks to technology, demographics, commodity
prices, and political uncertainty. Further, international trade
links countries’economies. Over a business cycle, govern-
ment outlays fall and tax receipts rise with economic activ-
ity. Such changes are called automatic stabilizers; they make
deficits vary with the business cycle. Governments often
raise discretionary spending or cut taxes during periods
of low output, further amplifying the connection of deficits
to economic activity. Because countries tend to share
business cycles, which are corre-
lated with deficits, deficits tend
to be correlated internationally. 
The portion of a deficit that is
due to the level of economic
activity is called the cyclical
deficit, while the structural deficit
is the shortfall that would exist
even if the level of economic
output were at its potential. The
right panel of the figure shows
estimates of structural deficits. 
Structural deficits can result
from changes in tax and spending
preferences or external events.
For example, the U.S. deficit rose
in 1992 when savings and loan depositors were bailed out.
And the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and wars
in Afghanistan and Iraq surely inflated the U.S. deficit
through higher defense and homeland security expendi-
tures. Indeed, the U.S. deficit in 2002 (3.4 percent of GDP)
was mostly structural (2.9 percent), not cyclical. 
The international correlation in structural deficits illus-
trates that the business cycle is not the only global influence
on fiscal deficits. For example, the “peace dividend,” the
cuts in defense spending after the fall of the Soviet Union,
accounted for some of the international fall in structural
deficits in the 1990s. Similarly, the extraordinary inter-
national bull market in equities in the late 1990s—which
was only weakly related to real economic activity—prob-
ably reduced deficits by increasing tax revenues on capital
gains. The decline in equity prices since 2000 has been
associated with a falloff in tax revenues on capital gains.
Finally, the Maastricht Treaty, which established the
European Monetary Union on January 1, 1999, limits
deficits to 3 percent of GDP. This treaty obligation forced
cuts in French and German deficits in the 1990s. 
In evaluating deficits, one should carefully consider
the source. Cyclical deficits, which often have a strong
global component, do not threaten long-term fiscal sol-
vency because they will be reversed over time. However,
large structural deficits—those greater than the country’s
average output growth rate—cannot be maintained forever
and might require adjustments to tax and spending policies. 
—Christopher J. Neely
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NOTE: The panels show fiscal deficits and structural deficits as a percentage of GDP. Deficits are 
measured as a percentage of GDP because larger, richer economies can more easily afford 
to run higher deficits than can poorer countries. Figures for 2003 and 2004 are projections.
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